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The Jews of Vienna from the “Anschluß” 
to the Holocaust [1987] 
Gerhard Botz ∗ 
Abstract: »Wiener Juden zwischen ,Anschluss’ und Holocaust«. In this article, 
the author examines the socio-economic driving forces and political authorities 
behind the persecution of Jews in Vienna from 1938 to 1943 in order to 
demonstrate that the anti-Semitic mobilization of substantial sections of the 
population was directly related to social and economic interests. This becomes 
clear through the author’s analysis of the radical nature of Viennese anti-
Semitism from the pogroms of 1938 and the systematic deportation of Jews to 
extermination camps. This article is structured as follows: 1. Introduction, 2. 
Exploration of the Perpetrators' Emotional Potential and Demonstration of 
Jewish Defencelessness, 3. The Conceptual Delineation and Definition of the 
Enemy Group, 4. Destruction of Economic Means of Subsistence, 5. Forced Emi-
gration, 6. Radicalization and Reichskristallnacht, 7. Spatial Segregation (Ghet-
toization), 8. Realizing the Nazi Stereotype of the ´Jew`, 9. Removal and Anni-
hilation. 
Keywords: Holocaust, Vienna, Jews, National Socialism, Austria, Anschluss 1938, 
social policy, aryanisation. 
1. Introduction  
Austria, and particularly Vienna, have managed so far to obscure their participation 
in the history of the Third Reich. After all, the 1943 Moscow Declaration of the 
Allied foreign ministers declared Austria the first victim of Hitler’s aggression, and 
the whole self-image of the Second Republic is based on this simplification of 
history. 
In this way their connection with, and responsibility for, the Nazi dictatorship 
has been completely removed from the historical consciousness of Austrians, who 
could logically assume that the extinction of independent statehood in 1938 was 
followed by a seven-year historical vacuum. Virtually none of the existing general 
histories of modern Austria stresses the considerable contribution to the functioning 
of the Third Reich of a large part of the population.1 The major role played in the 
                                                             
∗  Reprint of: Gerhard Botz. 1987. The Jews of Vienna from the “Anschluß” to the Holocaust. In 
Jews, Antisemitism and Culture in Vienna, ed. Gerhard Botz, Ivar Oxaal and Michael Pollak, 
185-204 and 276-82. London and New York.  
1  See for instance the otherwise comprehensive histories of Austria since the First World War: 
E. Weinzierl and K. Skalnik, eds., 1983, Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Repub-
 
HSR Suppl. 28 (2016)  │  317 
persecution and annihilation of the Jews by the Viennese – and not just party members 
or their ‘Reich-German’ superiors – would have to be singled out. I cannot present 
here an outline of the end of Vienna’s Jews without calling attention to these facts. A 
change of perspective is required from one which simply regards the Jews as victims 
of an imported anti-Semitic policy arising from German National Socialism to one 
which also looks at the identity of persecutors and the nature of their socio-
economic motives.2 
An analysis of the socio-economic forces and the political measures accompany-
ing the persecution of the Jews in Vienna from 1938 to 1945 also allows one to 
demonstrate that the sharp controversy which has sprung up recently concerning the 
‘Final Solution,’ particularly among German historians,3 is being conducted too 
narrowly. In this German debate two points of view confront each other: the first 
argues that Hitler’s personality, his actions and an early pre-determined plan of the 
Führer’s had envisaged the ‘Final Solution,’ which was then consistently put into 
practice;4 a second, opposing view stresses the gradual, step-by-step development 
of the concrete measures of persecution in the Third Reich. According to Hans 
Mommsen,5 the most explicit exponent of the second view, the cumulative radicali-
zation of National Socialist anti-Jewish policy arose chiefly from the internal dy-
namics of the rival power centres of the Third Reich6 and from the consequences of 
                                                                                                                                
lik, 2 vols., Graz: Styria; E. Weinzierl and K. Skalnik, eds., 1972, Österreich: Die Zweite Repub-
lik, 2 vols., Graz: Styria; P. Dusek, A. Pelinka and E. Weinzierl, 1981, Zeitgeschichte im Aufriß: 
Österreich von 1918 bis in die achtziger Jahre, Vienna: Jugend und Volk; N. Schausberger, 
1980, Österreich: Der Weg der Republik 1918-1980, Graz: Leykam. This is true also for 
scholarly researched specialized studies like H. Rosenkranz, 1978, Verfolgung und Selbstbe-
hauptung: Die Juden in Österreich 1938-1945, Vienna: Herold; Dokumentationsarchiv des 
österreichischen Widerstands, ed., 1975, Widerstand und Verfolgung in Wien 1934-1945: 
Eine Dokumentation, 3 vols., Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag (and the subsequent 
volumes on Upper Austria, Burgenland and Tyrol). 
2  This contribution is based mostly on my own earlier publications: G. Botz, 1975, Wohnungs-
politik und Judendeportation in Wien 1938 bis 1945, in Zur Funktion des Antisemitismus 
als Ersatz nationalsozialistischer Sozialpolitik, Vienna: Geyer; idem, 1980, Wien vom 'An-
schluß' zum Krieg: Nationalsozialistische Machtübernahme und politisch-soziale Umge-
staltung am Beispiel der Stadt Wien 1938/39, 2nd ed., Vienna: Jugend und Volk. 
3  Cf. G. Hirschfeld and L. Kettenacker, eds., 1981, Der 'Führerstaat': Mythos und Realität, 
Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta; I. Kershaw, 1985, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives 
of Interpretation, London: Edward Arnold, 82-105; K. Hildebrand, 1979, Das Dritte Reich, 
Munich: Oldenbourg, 175-80; M. Broszat, 1979, "Holocaust" und die Geschichtswissen-
schaft, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 27 (2): 285-98; J. Hiden and J. Farquharson, 
1983, Explaining Hitler's Germany: Historians and the Third Reich, London: Batsford, 43-7. 
4  G. Fleming, 1982, Hitler und die Endlösung: 'Es ist des Führers Wunsch', Munich: Limes; L. 
Dawidowicz, 1977, The War Against the Jews 1933-45, Harmondsworth: Penguin; S. Gor-
don, 1984, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
128-45. 
5  H. Mommsen, 1983, Die Realisierung des Utopischen: Die "Endlösung der Judenfrage" im 
Dritten Reich, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 9 (3): 381-420; M. Broszat, 1977, Hitler und die 
Genesis der "Endlösung": Aus Anlaß der Thesen von David Irving, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeit-
geschichte 25 (4): 739-75; K. A. Schleunes, 1970, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Po-
licy Toward German Jews, 1933-1939, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
6  Mommsen, op. cit., 394-5. 
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foreign and politico-military developments which moved towards the destruction of 
the Jews within the German sphere of power without direct initiatives by Hitler. 
In my opinion both positions underestimate the significance of the anti-Semitic 
mobilization of considerable parts of the population in favour of Nazi measures 
against the Jews; both underestimate the extent to which the persecution and annihi-
lation of the Jews satisfied immediate economic and social requirements of large 
groups and classes in a very concrete manner – a process of persecution which in 
fact acted as a surrogate for the social welfare policies the Nazis had promised their 
followers. The combination of anti-Semitic persecution and the satisfaction of 
material interests does not appear to me, at least in the Viennese case, to have been 
simply an attempt by the National Socialist regime to justify the persecution of the 
Jews – as Mommsen stresses to have been the case in the whole of the Third Reich 
– rather, material interests were one of antisemitism’s most powerful motivating 
forces. On this factor rested the ‘popular unanimity’7 of Viennese antisemitism 
since the nineteenth century, which had always been more than an ideological 
concept of racial values concerning the depravity of the Jews. It was no coincidence 
that Schönerer’s ideological, racial antisemitism had been denied success with 
Vienna’s masses,8 while Lueger’s pragmatic, economic, religio-cultural-based 
antisemitism could be made into the integrating force of his Catholic lower-middle-
class movement.9 The precondition for this was that the Jewish part of the popula-
tion was not a tiny minority, but represented a sufficiently large potential economic 
target, or was perceived as such by the anti-Semites. And this was the case in Vien-
na, where a pattern of relative Jewish affluence existed until the Nazi takeover. 
Viennese Jews were rather highly concentrated in middle-class occupations and the 
learned professions, as well as in capitalist circles.10 Thus the anti-Semites were of 
                                                             
7  P. G. J. Pulzer, 1964, The Rise of Political Antisemitism in Germany and Austria, New York: 
Wiley, 144-7, 279-87; idem, 1967, The Development of Political Antisemitism in Austria, in 
The Jews of Austria: Essays on their Life, History and Destruction, ed. J. Fraenkel, 429-43, 
London: Vallentine Mitchell; D. von Arkel, 1966, Antisemitism in Austria, PhD Diss., Univer-
sity of Leiden, 67-185; A. Pelinka, 1972, Stand oder Klasse? Die christliche Arbeiterbewe-
gung Österreichs 1933 bis 1938, Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 213 et seq.; K. Stuhlpfarrer, 1974, 
Antisemitismus, Rassenpolitik und Judenverfolgung in Österreich nach dem Ersten Welt-
krieg, Das österreichische Judentum: Voraussetzungen und Geschichte, Vienna: Jugend und 
Volk, 141-64; E. Weinzierl, 1969, Zu wenig Gerechte: Österreicher und Judenverfolgung, 
1938-1945, Graz: Styria. 
8  A. G. Whiteside, 1975, The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-
Germanism, Berkeley: University of California Press, esp. 107-40. 
9  J. W. Boyer, 1981, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: The Origins of the Christian 
Social Movement 1848-1897, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 184 et seq.; idem, 1982, 
Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 26: 125-44; K. Skalnik, 
1954, Dr Karl Lueger: Der Mann zwischen den Zeiten, Vienna: Herold. 
10  I. Oxaal and W. R. Weitzmann, 1985, The Jews of Pre-1914 Vienna: An Exploration of Basic 
Sociological Dimensions, Leo Baeck-Institute Year Book 30: 395-432; cf. also: W. von Weisl, 
1979, Die Juden in der Armee Österreich-Ungarns, Tel Aviv: Olamenu, 1-22; W. Häusler, To-
leranz, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus: Das österreichische Judentum des bürgerlichen 
Zeitalters (1782-1918), Das österreichische Judentum, op. cit., 83-140; Leo Goldhammer, 
1927, Die Juden Wiens: Eine statistische Studie, Vienna; G. Glockemeyer, 1937, Zur Wiener 
Judenfrage, Leipzig. 
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the opinion, and not without some justification, that harassing the Jews could bring 
them collective benefits. In fact, antisemitism was to a great extent also a substitute 
for social policy in favour of the non-Jewish population at the cost of Jews and 
other persecuted minorities in Vienna and other central and east European cities.11 
It was this high economic and social status of Jews which became the theme of the 
Nazi persecution in Vienna after the Anschluss. 
It was therefore not just pure demagoguery and propaganda in preparation for 
the persecution of the Jews when the Völkischer Beobachter, in its Vienna edition 
of 26 April 1938, wrote about the popular mood six weeks after the Anschluss: 
By the year 1942 the Jewish element in Vienna will have to have been wiped out 
and made to disappear. No shop, no business will be permitted by that time to be un-
der Jewish management, no Jew may find anywhere any opportunity to earn a living 
and with the exception of those streets where the old Jews and Jewesses are using up 
their money, the export of which is prohibited, while they wait for death, nothing of it 
may show itself in the city. (…) No one who knows Viennese opinion regarding the 
Jewish question will be surprised that the four years in which the economic death 
sentence on the Jews is to be executed seems much too long a time to them. They 
are puzzled by all the fuss, by the pedantic attention to the maintenance and protec-
tion of Jewish property; after all it is very simple: ‘The Jew must go – and his cash 
must remain’ (...) 
While in many instances National Socialism drew the attention of North-Germans to 
the private, almost unpolitical danger of the Jews, in Vienna, on the contrary, the Na-
zis professed a commitment to responsible education of the public. This posture was 
intended to demonstrate the blamelessness and purity of the movement – and thus 
to stem the exuberant local anti-Semitic radicalism, steering the understandably vi-
olent reactions to the Jewish excesses of a whole century into orderly channels. 
This means, and let everyone take note, because Germany is a state based on the law: 
nothing happens in our state except by due process of law. (…) Here there will be no 
pogroms, certainly not through Mrs Hinterhuber wanting to get at Sarah Cohen, in 
the third courtyard, on the half-landing, by the watertap.12 
These were the problems and perspectives of the Vienna Nazis immediately after 
the Anschluss. The measures of anti-Jewish persecution until the ‘Final Solution’ – 
‘eradication’ from the economy was the metaphor used in the Völkischer Beob-
achter of April 1938 – followed by and large these basic themes. But the persecu-
tion of the Jews in Vienna presented itself in a variety of forms, depending on 
particular circumstances: as a groundswell of spontaneous protest, or as a response 
to either an attachment of traditional elites to a bureaucratic concept of ‘law and 
order,’ or to the assertion of the anti-institutional radicalism of the activists of the 
Nazi movement, or even to the requirements of the foreign policies of the Greater 
                                                             
11  Botz, Wohnungspolitik, op. cit., 117-24; idem, 1974, "Arisierungen" und nationalsozialisti-
sche Mittelstandspolitik in Wien (1938-1940), Wiener Geschichtsblätter 29 (1): 122-36. 
12  Völkischer Beobachter, Vienna, 26 April 1938, 2, 4. 
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German Reich.13 Without intending to claim a teleological progress in a straight 
line in the ‘extirpation’ of Jews from Viennese society, I shall nevertheless show 
that the persecution of the Jews in Vienna from 1938 to 1942 moved forward in 
phases, with each of the various manifestations of antisemitism in Austria being 
built on the preceding one or at least complementary to it. One can distinguish eight 
distinctive stages in the progressive elimination of the Jews from Viennese society 
between 1938 and 1943; these eight stages were required for the progress of the 
Holocaust – the ultimate ‘elimination’ from society in the annihilation industries. 
2. Exploration of the Perpetrators' Emotional Potential 
and Demonstration of Jewish Defencelessness 
In Vienna the Anschluss was immediately accompanied by events resembling pog-
roms, such as had not occurred until then in the ‘Old Reich,’ that is to say in Ger-
many before the Anschluss of Austria.14 This was because the Anschluss was not 
just a transfer of power by a kind of occupation, but was at the same time an inter-
nal take-over of power by the Austrian Nazis and a popular rising. The political and 
social discontent that had accumulated over the years among the middle-class fol-
lowing of National Socialism was discharged with elemental force against the 
Jewish part of the population. In the foreground were symbolic acts aimed at the 
destruction of a sense of identity: humiliations and arrests, but also brutal physical 
assaults and robbery, while ‘scrubbing-squads’ of Jews were made to clean the 
streets or the quarters of the storm-troopers. Children had to deface their parents’ 
business premises with abusive words – Jude was thought to be one – and strictly 
orthodox Jews were forced to commit acts of sacrilege. Not only Nazis but also 
fellow-travellers and people who cared but little about National Socialism took part 
in week-long raids, with or without the ‘authorisation’ of the NSDAP.15 The targets 
of these raids were the private apartments of Jewish bankers and of members of the 
intelligentsia, of the Jewish middle classes as well as the tens of thousands of pov-
erty-stricken Jews, the Jewish-owned department stores of the Mariahilfer-Strasse 
as well as the pathetic little shops in the Leopoldstadt.16 Jewellery, cash, clothing, 
furs, carpets, works of art and furniture were carried off by the plundering mob. 
The shock suffered at that time by so many Viennese Jews can still be discerned in 
the many novels which have attempted to come to terms with that pogrom which until 
                                                             
13  H. Genschel, 1972, Die Verdrängung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich, Göttin-
gen, 165-6; D. Adam, 1972, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 195 et seq.; also K. 
Drobisch et al., 1973, Juden unterm Hakenkreuz, Frankfurt a. M., 50 et seq. 
14  G. E. R. Gedye, 1947, Die Bastionen fielen: Wie der Faschismus Wien und Prag überrannte, 
Vienna, 294-309; D. Wagner and G. Tomkowitz, 1968, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer: Der 
Anschluß Österreichs 1938, Munich. 
15  Botz, Wien, op. cit., 93-106. 
16  J. Bunzl, 1978, Arbeiterbewegung, "Judenfrage" und Antisemitismus. Am Beispiel des Wiener 
Bezirks Leopoldstadt, in Bewegung und Klasse, ed. G. Botz et al., 743-63, Vienna: Europa-
Verlag; R. Beckermann, 1984, Die Mazzesinsel, Vienna: Löcker. 
HSR Suppl. 28 (2016)  │  321 
then had been altogether unimaginable in a ‘civilised’ country.17 The despair drove 
many Jews, particularly of the upper middle classes, to commit suicide – as many as 
220 in March alone.18 Every other problem aired in the correspondence columns of 
the Neues Wiener Tagblatt in the beginning of April 1938 appeared under code words, 
such as ‘Question of Life and Death 1938,’ ‘Kismet,’ ‘Worried,’ ‘What is To Be 
Done?,’ ‘Desperate Wife and Mother,’ ‘Distraught,’ ‘Altogether in Despair,’ ‘1938,’ 
‘Unhappy,’ ‘Question of Existence.’19 
This pogrom-like situation might at the outset have been somewhat encouraged 
by the new men in power as a safety valve for the uncontrolled social revolutionary 
tendencies among their own followers; however, the longer the state of chaotic 
interventions in the economic and administrative life of Vienna continued, the higher 
rose the anguish of the leading Nazi functionaries. Most anxious of all was Josef 
Bürckel, who had been appointed Reich-Commissioner in Austria and who feared that 
the National Socialist ‘Reconstruction’ would be hindered by the chaos. Above all, 
Berlin had expressed concern that ‘in Austria there had occurred widespread confisca-
tions of property’ which had been impossible to control.20 Therefore measures were 
taken, even before the ‘plebiscite’ of 10 April 1938, to rein in the pogrom.21 This 
led to a phase of seemingly legal actions whose function it was to prepare the fur-
ther progress of anti-Jewish measures. 
3. The Conceptual Delineation and Definition of the 
Enemy Group 
As long as it was possible for non-Jews to become victims of persecution because 
of the blurred outlines of both the popular and the ‘scientific’ idea of ‘the Jew,’ 
there was no assurance that radical measures of persecution would be tolerated by 
the large but not actively participating parts of the population. This principle was 
later to become clear during the euthanasia actions. The category ‘Jews’ had, of 
course, been definitively delineated by the Nuremberg racial laws, which were 
formally introduced into Austria on 20 May 1938. They stated what legally consti-
tuted being a ‘Jew,’ the criteria being in the last resort based on religious-historical 
factors rather than racial-biological nations. Since Nazi genealogists made good use 
of the resulting boom, everyone soon knew whether or not he came under the clas-
sification of ‘Jew.’ 
This process of authoritative definition found its clearest preliminary expression 
in the special marking of identity cards for Jews. In July and August 1938, legisla-
                                                             
17  For literary accounts see: H. Hilsenrad, 1966, Brown was the Danube, New York, pp. 275 et 
seq.; G. Clare, 1983, Last Waltz in Vienna, London. 
18 Botz, Vienna, op. cit., 98-105; Rosenkranz, Verfolgung, op. cit., 39-41; wrong figures are still 
derived from Gedye, op. cit., 300, 309. 
19  Neues Wiener Amtsblatt, Vienna, 5 April 1938, 8. 
20 MD 3872/38, Archive of the City and Land of Vienna (abbreviated: AdStuLW), letter of J. 
Bürckel to Göring, 19 July 1938, R. 104/Pak/Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (abbreviated: BA). 
21  Wiener Zeitung, Vienna, 3 March 1938, 4; M.D. 2802/38, AdStuLW. 
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tion was introduced covering the entire Reich which required Jews to adopt the dis-
tinctive first names ‘Israel’ or ‘Sarah.’ The passports of Jews were also marked with a 
large red ‘J’ on the first page. From the age of about fifteen, all Jews were obliged to 
carry the identity card at all times; they also had to declare their Jewish identity ‘un-
asked, and on pain of prosecution, whenever they had dealings with the civil or Party 
authorities.’22 Moreover from the beginning of November 1938, all Jewish-owned 
shops had to display inscriptions in Hebrew lettering. 
In the course of the temporary advance of traditional authoritarian-bureaucratic 
tendencies in the Nazi policy in Austria during the summer of 1938, this restricting 
categorization was the precondition for a sort of ‘legal’ (i.e. regulated by law) anti-
semitism which showed itself in the schools, the professions, and the economy. In the 
area of education, blow followed blow against the Jews after the plebiscite of 10 
April 1938. On 24 April a Numerus clausus was introduced for Jewish university 
students (2 per cent), followed on 27 April by separation of Jewish pupils in the 
secondary schools and the establishment of eight purely Jewish secondary schools, 
and on 9 May by the same action with regards to primary, comprehensive and trade 
schools. By 1 July 183 Jewish teachers had been dismissed, and the number of 
Jewish pupils of compulsory school age diminished accordingly as many Jewish 
schools were closed down. From the autumn, only 1 per cent of university students 
were to be of Jewish descent; on 14 November they were completely excluded. In-
stead of the previous 6,000 secondary school pupils there were now only 500, all of 
them crammed into the single remaining secondary school. Altogether, approximately 
16,000 pupils had been affected by the ‘de-schooling’ which had taken place in April. 
‘At first they were taught in accommodation provided by the city. At the end of the 
school year 1938/39 all public education of Jewish children was forbidden.’23 
By the end of November 1938, those of mixed race were also excluded not only 
from the free professions, the press, literature, theatre, film, music and creative arts, 
but also from the professional bodies of physicians, pharmacists, lawyers and notaries 
public. They thereby lost to their ‘Aryan’ competitors their right to practise. 
By these measures, which carried out earlier demands of German nationalist and 
Christian Social antisemitism, the social and organizational networks of Viennese 
Jewry were destroyed, even before the physical destruction of the Jews set in. With 
the loss of the multiplicity of everyday Jewish social organizations, Jewish identity 
also lost its social basis in Vienna. Thus, Nazism destroyed an important precondi-
tion of the cultural achievements of the Viennese Jews. 
                                                             
22  Gesetzblatt für das Land Österreich, Vienna 327/1938; E. Mannlicher, 1942, Wegweiser 
durch die Verwaltung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Verwaltung im Reichsgau 
Wien, Berlin, 210-11, 233. 
23  Amtsblatt der Stadt Wien, vol. 46, no. 27, 2; 'Stadtchronik 1938/1940', Handbuch Reichsgau 
Wien, vol. 63/64, Vienna, 1941, 975-6. 
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4. Destruction of Economic Means of Subsistence 
The same kind of ‘legal’ discrimination was carried through in the economic field. 
In the public services and in some sectors of private enterprise, Jewish employees 
and workers were dismissed in large numbers, which led to a temporary increase in 
the rate of unemployment in Vienna. In spite of that, some rabid Austrian Nazis 
found too slow the process which had begun in March and was to continue for 
several more months. According to a plan of the Ostmark’s economics minister, Hans 
Fischböck, all 200,000 of Vienna’s Jews ought to relinquish their workplaces to un-
employed ‘Aryans’ in one comprehensive action. However, in contrast to the public 
sector and the free professions, the governmental agencies moved in fact with some 
caution in relation to private enterprise. Economic considerations were decisive. 
Reich-Commissioner Bürckel, who, notwithstanding his wide-ranging powers 
regarding ‘Jewish policy,’ was under strict instructions from Göring, proceeded 
from three principles. The aims were: first, to remove ‘the Jew’ unconditionally 
from the economy and finally from Austria altogether, especially from Vienna; 
second, ‘de-judaisation’ was to proceed in a way which would prevent any serious 
damage to export or domestic trade; and, third, it was required that the ‘Jewish 
question’ be solved in a legal manner by means of severe legislation in order to 
preserve the economy intact.24 
 These guidelines were difficult to put into effect at first, particularly in Vienna. 
In contrast to the ‘Old Reich,’ where the ‘de-judaisation’ of the economy was drag-
ging on, in Austria after March 1938 the ‘spontaneous Aryanisation’ was carried 
out completely without any orders from above and without following rules. Look-
ing back, Reich-Commissioner Bürckel remarked: ‘The splendid history of National 
Socialism and the rising in Austria has had a cloud cast over it by the extent of 
robbery and theft which occurred in the first few weeks, which required me to take 
most severe action.’25 
The extent of ‘Aryanisation’ had become so great in Vienna that it could no 
longer be met by improvisations as in the ‘Old Reich.’ According to National So-
cialist estimates, of the 146,000 businesses in Vienna, 36,000 (25 per cent) had 
been in Jewish hands; of the capital value of these firms – 800 million Reichsmark 
– 300 million was Jewish.26 Even after the wave of ‘spontaneous Aryanization,’ 
26,000 of these enterprises still remained. In some cases these were handed over to 
approximately 25,000 ‘Aryan administrators,’ which meant Nazis.27 In others the 
                                                             
24  M. Rieser, 1953, Österreichs Sterbeweg, Vienna, 131; R. Luža, 1975, Austro-German Relati-
ons in the Anschluss Era, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 217. 
25  Genschel, op. cit., 162. 
26 K. Schubert, 1940, Die Entjudung der ostmärkischen Wirtschaft und die Bemessung des 
Kaufpreises im Entjudungsverfahren, PhD Diss., University of World Trade, Vienna, 10; D. 
Walch, 1971, Die jüdischen Bemühungen um die materielle Wiedergutmachung durch die 
Republik Österreich, Vienna, 3; cf. A. Krüger, 1940, Die Lösung der Judenfrage in der deut-
schen Wirtschaft, Berlin, 64-5; L. Wittek-Saltzberg, 1970, Die wirtschaftspolitischen Aus-
wirkungen der Okkupation Österreichs, PhD Diss., Vienna, 225. 
27  Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichshof, 
Nuremberg, 1947 seq. vol. 27, 163 (doc. 1301-PS) (abbreviated: IMT). 
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enterprises were continued in the form of so-called ‘NSBO-enterprises’ (National 
Socialist Betriebs-Organisation-firms) by National Socialist co-operatives of the 
‘Aryan’ employees, which were then put under the control of NSDAP. 
To prevent senseless destruction of the economic capacity of the Ostmark and to 
mobilize for the Balkan trade which was a burning interest of Göring’s, Bürckel had 
no choice but to legalize the system of commissars which had spontaneously emerged 
as a ‘necessary evil,’ to get the policy to contain the worst excesses, and to attempt, in 
the months following the Anschluss, a half-way orderly method of ‘Aryanisation.’ In 
consequence ‘Aryanisation Instructions’ were speeded up, dictated by events in Vien-
na for the whole Reich at the end of April 1938. Administrative methods developed 
in Austria soon became models for the ‘Old Reich’ as well as for the ‘newly-
acquired territories of the Reich.’ 
The Nazi party itself increased the economic dangers by making ‘Aryanisation’ 
into an instrument of social and economic welfare in the hands of its members and 
followers – a process facilitated by the size of the Jewish economic sector in Vien-
na. At the same time this ‘middle-class’ welfare system came into conflict with the 
economic, and particularly macro-economic-orientated organs of the Nazi state. 
Most of the ‘provisional managers’ (Kommissare) were either unable or unprepared to 
take a long-term view of economic management, while on the other hand the ‘Four-
Year Plan’ was directed toward economic efficiency for war. The interests of the non-
Jewish middle class, moreover, favoured the liquidation of those frequently uneco-
nomic small and medium-sized Jewish businesses, a measure which was put into 
effect towards the end of 1938. The Vienna Nazi leadership was thus able to justify 
accelerating the concentration and improvising the structure of Vienna’s economy, 
which was limping along behind that of the ‘Old Reich’ anyway, even at the danger 
of causing bitter resentment among the 25,000 ‘provisional managers.’ 
For the Viennese Jews, ‘Aryanisation’ meant mostly economic expropriation. 
The most rapid ‘Aryanisation’ to the end of 1938 involved ‘several hundred Jewish 
enterprises of importance for defence and economic development’ – mainly large-
scale enterprises – all well-known obviously Jewish businesses’ as well as the big 
department stores.28 These especially were the targets of spontaneous or orchestrat-
ed anti-Semitic outbursts. The very large Jewish industrial enterprises and joint 
stock companies were approached by the Third Reich with circumspection; the 
property of foreign Jews was not touched until the outbreak of war. 
The radical policy of ‘Aryanisation,’ tried and carried out mostly in Vienna 
through a combination of spontaneous action from below and official regulation from 
above, earned distinction for the Austrian Minister for Economics, Labour and Fi-
nance, Dr Hans Fischböck. He had already aroused the admiration of Göring and the 
managers of the economy of the ‘Old Reich’ in the autumn. In consequence this 
procedure was applied to the whole of the Reich at the end of 1938. The Austrian 
procedure became a kind of model for the remaining parts of the Greater German 
Reich. 
                                                             
28  Ibid., vol. 28, 525 (1816-PS); R 104/Pak/,BA.; F. Romanik, 1957, Der Leidensweg der österrei-
chischen Wirtschaft 1933-1945, Vienna, 24-8; Adam, op. cit., 195 et seq.; Rosenkranz, Ver-
folgung, op. cit., 60-70. 
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5. Forced Emigration 
After a large part of Viennese Jewry had been ruined through the destruction of 
their economic base, they were obliged to leave the country. But they now faced 
such obstacles as travel expenses, immigration quotas, fees, the limited chances of 
integration in other countries, and the barriers of German bureaucracy and the 
‘Reich-escape tax’ (Reichsfluchtsteuer). The more successful the expropriation of 
the Jews became, the more difficult it became for Viennese Jews to find avenues 
for emigration. The Gestapo in Vienna therefore devised the following solu-
tion, as the chief of the Gestapo, Heydrich, reported after the Kristallnacht: 
We did it by demanding a certain sum of money through the Jewish community 
from the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. With this sum, plus some payments in 
foreign currency a number of poor Jews could also be got out. The problem was 
not to get rid of the rich Jews but of the Jewish mob.29 
The Gestapo utilized the enforced co-operation of the Jewish community organiza-
tion, the Kultusgemeinde, a division of labour between the persecutor and persecut-
ed which was to prove its usefulness right into the Nazi extermination camps. 
Eichmann had come to Vienna for this task and was to excel himself in the creation 
and management of the ‘Central Office for Jewish Emigration in Vienna’ to such an 
extent that it opened up a further career for him.30 As in other areas of the anti-
Jewish policy, this Central Office had grown out of the necessity of mastering the 
administrative problems of Nazism’s Jewish policy in Vienna. 
The activities of the Vienna Central Office considerably speeded up the enforced 
emigration of Jews, which reached its high point of almost 10,000 emigrants as 
early as September 1938, one month after its foundation. Between the Anschluss 
and the end of July 1938, only 18,000 Jews left Vienna as emigrants. In the three 
months to October 1938, however, 32,000 Jews emigrated; and by July of the next 
year a further 54,000 followed. On 30 November 1939 the count was 126,445 
Jewish emigrants, a number which did not significantly increase later on. In addi-
tion to the profits gained through ‘Aryanisation,’ this expulsion of the Jews brought 
the Reich the sum of 1.6 million dollars which had been raised by Jewish immigra-
tion aid societies by the end of November 1939. After the beginning of the war 
Jewish emigration soon came to an end. Even so, another 24,500 Viennese Jews 
managed to emigrate during the Second World War.31 
                                                             
29  IMT, vol. 28, doc. 1816-PS. 
30  Letter of Eichmann to Herbert Hagen, 8 May 1938, Microfilm T 175, R 413, 2,938.501, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C.; cf. also R. M. W. Kempner, 1961, Eichmann und Kom-
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31  Rosenkranz, Verfolgung, op. cit., 105-25, 168-78. J. Moser, 1966, Judenverfolgung in Öster-
reich 1938-1945, Vienna, 6 et seq. 
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6. Radicalization and Reichskristallnacht 
In the late summer of 1938 the bureaucratically softened law-and-order phase of the 
Nazi regime in Austria was followed by a newly radicalized policy. The threatening 
economic and socio-political crisis brought about by the increased armaments 
policy urgently required further foreign policy and military expansion,32 which 
went hand in hand with increasing severity of control over internal political adver-
saries, national minorities and Jews. The Reichskristallnacht of 9 November 193833 
marked the beginning of a new phase in the politics of the Third Reich. Vienna, 
once again in the vanguard, had already witnessed pogrom-like attacks against Jews 
in October. 
The Vienna pogrom was probably more violent and the cause of more blood-
shed, as far as the Jewish population was concerned, than that in the ‘Old Reich.’ 
Apart from the thousands of shops and dwellings demolished in Vienna, 42 syna-
gogues and prayer rooms were burnt down, at least 27 Jews were killed34 and 88 
were severely injured. In addition, the numbers of those who out of despair made an 
end to their lives rose by leaps and bounds. In Vienna 6,547 were arrested in the 
course of the Judenaktion, 3,700 of whom were taken to the concentration camp of 
Dachau straight away. The greater part of the concentration camp detainees were 
released only during the first part of 1939 on production of proof of emigration 
documents, or on the condition of emigration within fourteen days.35 
The result of this ‘unchaining of the lowest instincts,’ as the representatives of ‘or-
derly, legal’ antisemitism in the Gestapo uneasily put it,36 brought with it in the end a 
speeding-up of ‘Aryanisation’ and a radicalization of the entire anti-Jewish policy as 
Hitler’s foreign policy moved towards the Second World War. 
7. Spatial Segregation (Ghettoization) 
A few days after the pogrom of November 1938, there was an intensified revival of 
‘spontaneous Aryanisation’ of houses and flats such as had occurred in the days 
immediately after the Anschluss. This time, however, the robbery of Jewish dwell-
ings was managed from above as a means of propaganda and served as indemnifi-
cation of ‘comrades, men of the people, who had served the Nazi movement in 
especially deserving ways.’37 To cope with this problem, which assumed immense 
proportions, the Vienna City Council – but not the Reich authorities or the NSDAP 
                                                             
32  Cf. T. W. Mason, 1975, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft: Dokumente und Materialien 
zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936-1939, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 119-58. 
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Verfolgung, op. cit., 159-67; cf. H. Graml, 1955, Der 9. November 1938: Reichskristallnacht, 
Bonn; L. Kochan, 1957, Pogrom: 10. November 1938, London. 
34  Recent Research has shown that these figures have to be reduced substantially (Botz 2016). 
35  Botz, Wien, op. cit., 402 and 533. 
36  Quotation see: Widerstand und Verfolgung, Wien, op. cit., vol. 3, 279-80. 
37  MD 3300/1938, AdStuLW. 
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– devised administrative procedures and prepared a draft law to deprive Jewish 
tenants of protection. Of particular interest to the Nazi City Council administration 
– which calculated a housing shortage of about 70,000 dwellings for the total indig-
enous population of Vienna plus new arrivals from the Reich – were the dwellings 
occupied by Jews, originally also numbering 70,000 and representing approximate-
ly 10 per cent of the total housing stock of Vienna. By the end of 1938 alone, fol-
lowing forced emigration and ‘spontaneous Aryanisation,’ 44,000 Jewish homes 
had been occupied by ‘Aryans,’ but there remained more than 26,000 dwellings to 
be ‘Aryanised.’ 
Once again, a problem was tackled by the Reich authorities for the territories 
under their control only after the solution had presented itself in Vienna. The struc-
ture of the housing problem and the acute need for accommodation in Vienna, given 
the fact that Jewish property constituted a significant economic share, created in the 
city a special radical form of persecution of the Jews. The accommodation occupied 
by the Jews, and therefore at the disposal of the Nazi regime, totalled 70,000 dwell-
ings – 6,000 more than the Social Democrats in ‘Red Vienna’38 had managed in 
fifteen years of intensive building policy! The intensification of the war economy in 
the Third Reich and its internal supply crisis in 1939 made the procedures devel-
oped in Vienna worth copying throughout the Nazi sphere of power. I have charac-
terized this specific substitutive form of socio-political procedure, including certain 
aspects of ‘business Aryanisation,’ as negative social policy.39 
Complementary to the ‘Aryanisation’ of homes was the development of semi-
ghettoes in city districts along the Danube Canal, particularly in the Leopoldstadt. 
The concentration of the Viennese Jews (still numbering almost 100,000 in October 
1939 and now defined as ‘Jews by race’ in the sense of the Nuremberg laws) in 
single houses, entire blocks and parts of some districts was partly a side-effect of 
the legal framework of the ‘Aryanisation procedure,’ and partly a deliberate policy 
of the Viennese Nazi district leaders. This process of relocation went on until it 
found its final conclusion in 1942. 
This process of segregation again aroused the objections of those Nazi function-
aries, party members and ‘comrades’ who were affected by the ghetto formation; they 
insistently demanded the removal of the Jews from their district, not least so as to 
seize for themselves the remaining, often overcrowded, Jewish homes. As early as 
July 1939, a plan had surfaced in Reich-Commissioner Bürckel’s office to expel the 
remaining Viennese Jews to barracked encampments; the plan envisaged ‘an intensive 
productive employment of the inmates.’40 The Viennese City administration clearly 
                                                             
38  F. Czeike, 1962, Liberale, christlichsoziale und sozialdemokratische Kommunalpolitik (1861-
1934), dargestellt am Beispiel der Gemeinde Wien, Vienna, 104; cf. P. Feldbauer, 1977, 
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also A. Lichtblau, 1984, Wiener Wohnungspolitik 1892-1919, Vienna: Verlag für Gesell-
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39  See G. Botz, 1976, National Socialist Vienna: Anti-Semitism as a Housing Policy, Wiener 
Library Bulletin 29 (39/40): 47-55. 
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had in mind two concentration camp-like labour camps in the vicinity of Vienna 
and by the beginning of September 1939 had prepared detailed building plans. 
A change in these plans came with the outbreak of war. The planned ‘overall 
measures’ of which Heydrich informed the commanders of the SS-Einsatzgruppen in 
Hitler’s name on September 1939, envisaged the early deportation of 300,000 poorer 
Jews from ‘Greater Germany’ to Poland. They also cast a glance at a ‘Final Goal’ 
(Endziel) which was not yet clearly defined.41 Only after the rapid conquest of Poland 
made that more comprehensive solution appear realistic did the Viennese authorities 
abandon their plans of re-locating the Jews in a nearby vicinity. That Hitler had the 
‘declared intention’ in supporting this re-location measure ‘to cleanse the Ostmark of 
Jews as a beginning’ is supported by sources.42 A memorandum in Bürckel’s staff 
files states: ‘This re-location procedure will be concluded in three quarters of a year 
at the latest. With it the Jewish problem in Vienna will have been completely 
solved.’43 
It cannot be excluded, given the early date of the proposed deportation initiative in 
Vienna, that Viennese anti-Jewish policy had an influence on the Reich policy in this 
area as well. After all, Hitler may well have looked with greatest interest, as well as 
sense of first-hand knowledge, at that city where he had first learned of the ‘Jewish 
problem.’44 We see here a typical oscillation and opportunism in the anti-Jewish 
policy: always working toward the ultimate goal within the realm of the possible, 
never restricting itself to any single line of policy. 
How this deportation policy was implemented in Vienna, in so far as it had not 
simply arisen from the pressure by the ‘Aryan’ Viennese, is revealed in the follow-
ing citation from a report to Bürckel by a National Socialist Ortsgruppenleiter from 
a Vienna Jewish residential area (Rossau-Alsergrund) in 3 October 1939: 
The extent of anti-Jewish feeling in the population is beyond measure. It is entirely 
thanks to the exertion of all our energy that in no case have riots occurred. I am 
fully conscious that this cannot be carried on forever, and that it is a pretty thank-
less task for a political leader, you will understand. The populace constantly points 
to the fact that the Jews are the only ones responsible for the war, and that they 
ought to be dealt with accordingly. People cannot understand why Jews receive the 
same quantities of food-stuffs as do Aryans. They fail to understand why Jews are 
not conscripted for forced labour and are left to pursue their dark schemes. The 
population is completely convinced that the Jews know of ways and means to ob-
tain more goods, even these days, than they are entitled to. Proof, however, is not 
available, since this would be the task of the police to provide, who cannot cope in 
our Jew-infested district. The population sees it sometimes as a sign of weakness 
that organs of the Party are not entitled to do away with abuses. People feel them-
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selves severely disadvantaged, as long as ‘Aryans’ have to live in damp cellars 
while Jews are permitted to wallow in beautiful apartments. The morale of part of 
the population is being so thoroughly affected by their living in such close proxim-
ity with the Jews that it will not be possible for many years, in spite of great ef-
forts, to win them over. Therefore I propose: 1. Either to set male Jews to work in 
mines or similar labour where they can be supervised easily, and accommodate 
their female family members in nearby camps. 2. Or, should this not be possible, to 
consider their evacuation to Poland, east of the Vistula, since it is all the same 
whether 2.5 or 2.7 million Jews live in Poland. 3. Should this be impossible as 
well, then the transfer of Jews should be carried out under other considerations 
than hitherto. Either: 4. to those habitations which are unhealthy (mainly cellar 
flats where even today Aryans have to live with their children) or 5. into apart-
ments exposed to the dangers of air raids (4th or 5th floor).45 
Procurement of accommodation at the expense of the Jews, i.e. negative social 
policy, also played a central role in all other newly conquered territories of the 
Third Reich and in the ‘Final Solution,’ though I shall not go into the question of 
how far this applied to Poland and Romania. It was probably less a mere instrument 
of rationalization and pseudo-moral legitimation than an effective moving force 
towards the ‘Final Solution.’46 
Until the beginning of 1942, by which time the victorious Wehrmacht had 
opened up new perspectives on Jewish transportation to bleak and unhealthy reser-
vations (previously the French colony of Madagascar had been mooted), insur-
mountable obstacles had arisen due to the internally competing institutions of the 
Third Reich; hence the deportation of Jews did not really get under way. However, 
as early as October 1939 there had been two transports of Jews from Vienna to 
Nisko; although their continuation was prevented by Himmler ‘for reasons of tech-
nical difficulties.’47 Obviously, the pressure of events, and the requisite internal 
radicalization of the Third Reich in the phase of the Blitzkrieg, had not yet devel-
oped sufficiently to overcome the obstacles to such mass deportation measures. 
8. Realizing the Nazi Stereotype of the ´Jew` 
The formation of ghettoes and the earlier elimination of the Jews from the economy 
and the rule of law had led to a further deterioration of the already intolerable situa-
tion of the Viennese Jews. In this way the National Socialist persecution policy 
created a multitude of Jews who corresponded to the stereotype promoted by Julius 
Streicher in Der Stürmer: filthy, down-and-out Jews who snatched greedily at any 
chance of business dealings. The consequence of the persecution re-enforced the 
propagandistic stereotype of the ‘Jews’ and broke the remains of solidarity on the 
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part of their ‘Aryan’ neighbours at the same time. The ‘Jew’ became as disgusting 
for the ‘Aryans’ as the anti-Semites had depicted him as being since time immemo-
rial. For ‘vermin’ and ‘parasites’ nothing but extermination was appropriate, as 
Völkisch anti-Semites had already imagined several decades earlier.48 Only in the 
wake of this process of de-humanizing the Jews did it become possible further to 
radicalize the persecution, thus making the Holocaust itself capable of realization. 
There remained in Vienna at the beginning of October 1939, 66,000 so-called 
‘persons of Jewish faith’ (Glaubensjuden), 39,000 persons of so-called ‘Jewish 
race’ (Rassejuden),49 and approximately 13,000 foreign and stateless Jews. Their 
further pauperization and marginalization was once more put in motion by ‘legislative 
measures.’ As early as September 1939 a curfew was imposed and the existing limita-
tions on access to parks and recreational facilities were tightened even further. At the 
beginning of January 1940 the times during which Jews, whose ration cards were 
marked with a ‘J,’ could enter provision stores were limited to those when goods in 
demand had been sold out. 
In 1942 Jews were forbidden to obtain cigars, eggs, meat, full-fat milk and white 
flour. After they had already been forced in 1939 to hand over all jewellery and 
precious metal, they were now robbed of fur and woollen clothing. Since the end of 
1941 they had been excluded from all public social services, as well as from listen-
ing to the radio, use of public transport and use of the telephone. They were forbid-
den to leave the area of Greater Vienna without permission. The apex of social 
discrimination was reached with the law of September, 1941, which required the 
identification of Jews by a yellow Star of David-Judenstern, which was to be worn 
prominently on the left side of the chest. Without it Jews were prohibited to show 
themselves in public.50 
A National Socialist report about the economic situation of Vienna’s Jews in the 
summer of 1940 stated ‘that they mostly had no income, apart from isolated cases 
like doctors and dental technicians who treated Jews and lawyers who represented 
Jews.’ Of Vienna’s ‘Jews by faith’ about 40,000 were without means. In September 
1939, 35,500 persons were fed each day by the Jewish communal administration 
and 31,364, about one and a half of the remaining 66,000, received cash grants. The 
budget of the Jewish community required a monthly sum of 1.4 to 1.5 million 
Reichsmark in order to fulfil all the tasks of social support with which it had been 
charged and in order to finance emigration up to August 1939. Since these large 
sums came mainly from foreign-aid committees, the start of the war meant an al-
most total collapse of Jewish self-aid. 
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The situation of these Viennese Jews was made even more difficult by the fact 
that 40 per cent of them were above 60 years of age, with those less than 40 years old 
amounting to only 19 per cent. In addition, women were overrepresented by a factor 
of two to one. The preponderance of the aged and of women was a consequence of 
emigration – for economically active persons, men, and middle- and upper-class Jews 
emigration was less difficult – and the extremely deteriorated conditions of life 
which had made the remaining Viennese Jews into a moribund community even 
before their deportation.51 
9. Removal and Annihilation 
In June 1940 Hitler informed the new Gauleiter and Reich-Commissioner of Vien-
na, Baldur von Schirach, that it was his firm intention to remove the Jews of Vienna 
to the Generalgovernement in Poland. Half a year later the Führer repeated that ‘the 
60,000 Jews who still live in the Reichsgau Vienna are to be despatched with all 
haste to the Generalgovernement even now in wartime, because of the need for 
housing in Vienna.’52 And in November 1941, Hitler admonished his Reich-
Commissioner of Vienna to apply himself energetically to the deportation of all the 
Jews and then to the removal of all ‘Czechs and other ethnic aliens.’ That way, the 
dwellings of 400,000 to 500,000 people would be made available to the ‘Aryan’ 
Viennese!53 
Thus, the systematic persecution of minorities in the Third Reich was a calculat-
ed variable in the redistribution of economic benefits. It seems most likely that the 
political process which led to the ‘Final Solution’ might well have continued in the 
case of a German ‘Final Victory’ in the war, and might also have included the 
Czechs and other ‘alien ethnic minorities’ in the then expanded German conquered 
territories. In Vienna, the appropriate administrative organization was already in 
preparation; Viennese Nazis spoke in this context of ‘the expulsion and removal of 
the Czech minority in Vienna.’54 However, tactical considerations seem to have led 
Himmler as early as May 1940 to postpone this other kind of ‘final solution while 
the war is in progress.’ 
Preference was to be given instead to the ‘Final Solution’ of the Jewish Ques-
tion. Until it was dismantled on 1 November 1942, the Viennese Jewish community 
administration was obliged to compile the lists for the series of transports which 
started in 1942. Afterwards this role was taken over by ‘the Council of the Jewish 
Elders.’ Soon ‘Jewish search personnel’ and ‘marshals’ had to drag the Jewish 
victims to the transports under the supervision of the SS. Initially, the arrests took 
place during the day. Since the ‘marshals’ often had to wait for hours until the 
Jewish victims had returned home, the arrests were soon carried out at night when 
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the Jews were under curfew.55 Persons of ‘mixed race’ – Mischlinge of first and 
second degree –were safe from these arrests, as at first were employees and workers 
of the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde, invalided ex-servicemen, and indispensable 
workers; but later only those of ‘mixed race’ remained exempt.56 
Petty offences, like the inadvertent covering over of the Jewish star, possession 
of a cigarette butt, or infringement of the curfew by a few minutes, led to immediate 
despatch to a staging camp. There the Jews had to hand over all their cash while 
awaiting the next transport and sign a document to state that they relinquished 
voluntarily any claim on their remaining property in favour of the Reich. Each was 
allowed no more than 50kg of luggage on the journey by cattle-car, the hardships of 
which many did not survive. 
Between 15 February and 12 March 1941, five transports went to the Gen-
eralgovernement; this was then discontinued because of the preparations for the 
attack on the Soviet Union, although only one half of the contingents originally 
planned had been dispatched. In Poland the Jews were dumped in little country 
towns, which caused an acute food shortage.57 
Before suffering mass murder the Jews had to be moved out of sight of the ‘Ary-
an’ Viennese, so that their extermination like ‘vermin’ could not easily stir human 
compassion among their fellow Viennese. What happened to them in far-away Poland 
was not clearly known and did not disturb very many Viennese. The anonymization of 
the victims of automatic weapons and bombing raids, which enables the spatial and 
emotional separation of the commanders and perpetrators from the suffering and pain 
of the human beings attacked – thus preventing the formation of empathy which might 
inhibit such deeds – is certainly a precondition of modern warfare, as it was for the 
Nazis’ ‘Final Solution.’ 
After the attack on the Soviet Union, the SS terror organization moved on to the 
direct murder of the Jews. Early in the course of the accelerating ‘total solution of 
the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence,’ trucks were used which had 
been converted into mobile gas-chambers. Later in the autumn of 1941, the SS 
began to put into use the gas-chambers which had been found useful in the ‘eutha-
nasia programme.’ 
In 1942 mass deportations set in anew, and this caused a sudden monthly lower-
ing of the numbers of remaining Viennese Jews by 4,000 to 5,000 persons. In that 
year alone, 32,000 of the 43,000 Jews were deported. On 15 April 1943 there were 
still 7,544 Jews in Vienna. Of those, nearly 3,900 lived in ‘privileged’ mixed mar-
riages and about 1,550 in ‘non-privileged’ ones.58 
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By the end of 1944, the Jews in Vienna were again reduced by one-quarter 
through the deportation of 1,646 and transfer of 249 Jews to concentration camps. 
Only about 5,700 Viennese Jews survived the Third Reich in Vienna. Beyond that 
only 2,142 survived the inferno of the annihilation camps where, including the 
concentration camps, approximately 65,500 Austrian Jews had met their end.59 
According to Erika Weinzierl60 only slightly more than 200 Jews had been hid-
den by non-Jewish Viennese and thereby saved. This figure is to be contrasted with 
another one which is based on an estimate of Simon Wiesenthal’s in 1966. To quote 
Wiesenthal: ‘At least 3 million murdered Jews have to be blamed on the Austrians 
who were participants in the crimes of National Socialists (as SS and concentration 
camp personnel).’61 
In conclusion, the following points summarize the process of the persecution of 
the Jews and their elimination from Viennese society: 
1) The events leading up to the destruction of the Viennese Jews must be seen as a 
process, but not one with a clearly-defined goal or one that moved unilinearly in 
a predefined political direction. Although the general direction of antisemitism 
was determined, it was not fixed in detail in its timing, means or degree of radi-
calism. 
2) National Socialist anti-Jewish policy found widespread support in Vienna; it was 
based on anti-Jewish traditions popular since the Middle Ages. 
3) The annihilation of the Viennese Jews in the Third Reich showed essentially the 
same dynamic of hostility towards the Jews as existed in Vienna already before 
1900, as indicated in other papers in this volume. Its most powerful driving forc-
es in the Third Reich, radiating from the regional areas, were immediate material 
interests. 
This should not be taken to mean that the strong antisemitism of many Viennese did 
not also have socio-psychological, cultural or religious causes. The official and party-
organized persecution of the Jews was put into effect with a thoroughness which on 
occasion called forth criticism from even the Gestapo and the economic and state 
bureaucracy. This points to the extent of the pent-up and socially explosive frustration 
at the root of the antisemitism of the population and the Nazis of Vienna. It also re-
flects the massive economic and status-anxiety of the middle layers of a society which 
had entered the dynamic of capitalist development, threatened by crises and in a state 
of rapid modernization. Antisemitism doubtless did have a strong anti-capitalist 
dimension. 
Since the economic motives of Jew-hatred have to be reckoned the stronger, the 
more insecure the economic situation of a country –and the more prominent, afflu-
ent and concentrated the Jewish population – the antisemitism in Vienna was more 
intense than that in the Old Reich. In consequence, from 1938 on Vienna was al-
                                                             
59  Moser, op. cit., 47-52; Rosenkranz, Anschluss, op. cit., 526. 
60  E. Weinzierl, 1969, Zu wenig Gerechte, Österreicher und Judenverfolgung 1938-1945, Graz: 
Styria, 145-6. 
61 Memorandum of S. Wiesenthal of 12 October 1966, sent to the Austrian Federal Chancellor 
Josef Klaus; copy in: Dokumentationszentrum des Bundes jüdischer Verfolgter des Nazire-
gimes, Vienna. 
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ways a few steps ahead of Germany in the process of persecution of the Jews. Not 
only were the comparable measures applied earlier in Vienna than in Germany, but 
they could also count on much broader support among the non-Jewish population. 
Here, the organizational instruments and procedures could be developed which 
would later be applied by Eichmann in the ‘Final Solution.’ It is not surprising, 
therefore, that in connection with the expulsion of the Jews from their homes, con-
crete plans were devised in the office of the Reich-Commissioner earlier than any-
where else in the Greater German Reich (except perhaps by Hitler and the inner-
most circles of the leadership) from the mass deportation and incineration in con-
concentration camps of the entire remaining Jewish population of Vienna. 
The response of the party membership to the announcement of a considerably 
more stringent Jewish policy immediately after the start of the war, which eventual-
ly was to bring about the deportation and annihilation of 65,000 Viennese Jews, 
shows that fantasies and desires in that direction had long been entertained. The 
‘Final Solution’ had already been within the realm of the thinkable before the Nazi 
period and it became feasible only at the end of a politico-social-psychological 
process, which dehumanized step-by-step the image of the ‘Jew’ and weakened the 
still existing feelings of solidarity with the victims among the non-Jewish popula-
tion. At the beginning of this process anti-Semitic action on such a massive scale 
was implausible; by the end it was a self-fulfilling prophecy.62 
                                                             
62  See also: H. Buchheim, 1965, Die SS - das Herrschaftsinstrument. Befehl und Gehorsam, in 
Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. 1, Munich: dtv. A similar mechanism seems to govern South 
Africa's Apartheid policy (cf. J. Lelyveld, 1985, Move Your Shadow South Africa, Black and 
White, New York: NY Times). 
